| nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
| 1 |
A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic modelsof conflict
|
Hugh M. Neary
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 373-388
16 p.
|
artikel
|
| 2 |
Albert Breton, Competitive governments: Aneconomic theory of politics and public finance.
|
James M. Buchanan
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 523-524
2 p.
|
artikel
|
| 3 |
An analysis of voter predictive dimensions and recoveryof the underlying issue space
|
Tom Tanner
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 315-334
20 p.
|
artikel
|
| 4 |
Charles K. Rowley, Willem Thorbecke and Richard E.Wagner, Trade protection in the United States.
|
Thomas D. Willett
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 511-514
4 p.
|
artikel
|
| 5 |
Club theory: Thirty years later
|
Todd Sandler
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 335-355
21 p.
|
artikel
|
| 6 |
Committee characteristics and re-election margins:An empirical investigation of the US House
|
W. Mark Crain
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 271-285
15 p.
|
artikel
|
| 7 |
Congress of the European Economic Association, Berlin, Germany, 1998 Announcement and call for papers
|
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 529-530
2 p.
|
artikel
|
| 8 |
Cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy
|
Toke Skovsgaard Aidt
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 455-475
21 p.
|
artikel
|
| 9 |
Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act of 1982:A public choice analysis of turnover in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives
|
Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 357-371
15 p.
|
artikel
|
| 10 |
John M. Carey, Term limits and legislativerepresentation.
|
Elizabeth Garrett
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 517-522
6 p.
|
artikel
|
| 11 |
Majority rule and the public provision of a private good
|
Miguel Gouveia
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 221-244
24 p.
|
artikel
|
| 12 |
Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the Soviet Union
|
Richard D. Anderson, Jr.
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 287-314
28 p.
|
artikel
|
| 13 |
Roger Middleton, Government versus the market:The growth of the public sector, economic management, andBritish economic performance, 18901979.
|
Brian Goff
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 525-527
3 p.
|
artikel
|
| 14 |
Self-imposed term limits
|
Edward L. Glaeser
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 389-394
6 p.
|
artikel
|
| 15 |
Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair division: From cake cutting to dispute resolution.
|
Joe Oppenheimer
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 514-517
4 p.
|
artikel
|
| 16 |
The Bundesbanks path to independence: Evidencefrom the 1950s
|
Helge Berger
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 427-453
27 p.
|
artikel
|
| 17 |
The economics of political campaign finance: FECA andthe puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers
|
Jeffrey Milyo
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 245-270
26 p.
|
artikel
|
| 18 |
The European Central Bank: Independence, accountabilityand strategy: A review
|
Jakob de Haan
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 395-426
32 p.
|
artikel
|
| 19 |
Tullocks rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditurerequirement
|
L. Schoonbeek
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 477-486
10 p.
|
artikel
|
| 20 |
Who wants the euro and why? Economic explanations ofpublic attitudes towards a single European currency
|
Manfred Gärtner
|
|
1997
|
93 |
3 |
p. 487-510
24 p.
|
artikel
|
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