nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets
|
Forges, Françoise |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 135-145 11 p. |
artikel |
2 |
Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
|
Moulin, Hervé |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 96-119 24 p. |
artikel |
3 |
An axiomatic theory of political representation
|
Chambers, Christopher P. |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 375-389 15 p. |
artikel |
4 |
Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
|
Luo, Xiao |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 248-263 16 p. |
artikel |
5 |
Dynamic psychological games
|
Battigalli, Pierpaolo |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 1-35 35 p. |
artikel |
6 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. IFC- 1 p. |
artikel |
7 |
Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus
|
Kopylov, Igor |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 354-374 21 p. |
artikel |
8 |
Folk theorem with communication
|
Obara, Ichiro |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 120-134 15 p. |
artikel |
9 |
Global Newton Method for stochastic games
|
Govindan, Srihari |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 414-421 8 p. |
artikel |
10 |
Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty
|
Sun, Yeneng |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 432-443 12 p. |
artikel |
11 |
Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
|
Kajii, Atsushi |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 337-353 17 p. |
artikel |
12 |
Mechanism design with collusive supervision
|
Celik, Gorkem |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 69-95 27 p. |
artikel |
13 |
Multitask principal–agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
|
Bond, Philip |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 175-211 37 p. |
artikel |
14 |
Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning
|
Koulovatianos, Christos |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 280-295 16 p. |
artikel |
15 |
Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
|
Gershkov, Alex |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 36-68 33 p. |
artikel |
16 |
Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
|
Gul, Faruk |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 146-174 29 p. |
artikel |
17 |
Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation
|
Crutzen, Benoît S.Y. |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 264-279 16 p. |
artikel |
18 |
Repeated games with one-memory
|
Barlo, Mehmet |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 312-336 25 p. |
artikel |
19 |
Structural holes in social networks: A remark
|
Houy, Nicolas |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 422-431 10 p. |
artikel |
20 |
Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
|
Milgrom, Paul |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 212-247 36 p. |
artikel |
21 |
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle
|
Lamy, Laurent |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 390-413 24 p. |
artikel |
22 |
The Society for the Promotion of Economic Theory http://www.nyu.edu/jet/spet.html
|
|
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 444- 1 p. |
artikel |
23 |
Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
|
Chiesa, Gabriella |
|
2009 |
144 |
1 |
p. 296-311 16 p. |
artikel |