nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
|
Selten, Reinhard |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 213-263 51 p. |
artikel |
2 |
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
|
Harsanyi, John C. |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 91-122 32 p. |
artikel |
3 |
Announcement
|
|
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 269-270 2 p. |
artikel |
4 |
Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
|
Aumann, Robert J. |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 6-19 14 p. |
artikel |
5 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. i- 1 p. |
artikel |
6 |
Editor's note
|
Kalai, Ehud |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 1-2 2 p. |
artikel |
7 |
Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
|
Roth, Alvin E. |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 164-212 49 p. |
artikel |
8 |
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria
|
Fudenberg, Drew |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 20-55 36 p. |
artikel |
9 |
Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
|
Gale, John |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 56-90 35 p. |
artikel |
10 |
Nobel symposium on game theory: Rationality and equilibrium in strategic interaction
|
Skyrms, Brian |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 3-5 3 p. |
artikel |
11 |
Subjective games and equilibria
|
Kalai, Ehud |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 123-163 41 p. |
artikel |
12 |
The 50th anniversary of TGEB
|
Lucas, William F. |
|
1995 |
8 |
1 |
p. 264-268 5 p. |
artikel |