nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
A comment on “Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games” by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247–262]
|
Kuzmics, Christoph |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 240-242 3 p. |
artikel |
2 |
Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures
|
Xiong, Siyang |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 442-446 5 p. |
artikel |
3 |
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
|
Bozbay, Irem |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 407-417 11 p. |
artikel |
4 |
Bargaining with revoking costs
|
Dutta, Rohan |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 144-153 10 p. |
artikel |
5 |
Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study
|
Bednar, Jenna |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 12-31 20 p. |
artikel |
6 |
Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
|
Haruvy, Ernan |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 208-221 14 p. |
artikel |
7 |
Comment on: “Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences”
|
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 235-239 5 p. |
artikel |
8 |
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
|
Heller, Yuval |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 222-234 13 p. |
artikel |
9 |
Dynamic coordination with individual learning
|
Dasgupta, Amil |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 83-101 19 p. |
artikel |
10 |
Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma
|
Maruta, Toshimasa |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 269-284 16 p. |
artikel |
11 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. IFC- 1 p. |
artikel |
12 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. i- 1 p. |
artikel |
13 |
Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences
|
Norman, Thomas W.L. |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 311-320 10 p. |
artikel |
14 |
Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games
|
Carmona, Guilherme |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 418-430 13 p. |
artikel |
15 |
Group robust stability in matching markets
|
Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 394-398 5 p. |
artikel |
16 |
Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept
|
Halpern, Joseph Y. |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 184-207 24 p. |
artikel |
17 |
Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation
|
Chameni Nembua, C. |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 431-433 3 p. |
artikel |
18 |
Minimum cost arborescences
|
Dutta, Bhaskar |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 120-143 24 p. |
artikel |
19 |
Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics
|
Hommes, Cars H. |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 434-441 8 p. |
artikel |
20 |
Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
|
Dutta, Bhaskar |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 154-169 16 p. |
artikel |
21 |
On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
|
Oyama, Daisuke |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 321-331 11 p. |
artikel |
22 |
Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence
|
Van Essen, Matthew |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 366-381 16 p. |
artikel |
23 |
Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
|
Bochet, Olivier |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 52-67 16 p. |
artikel |
24 |
Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach
|
Andreozzi, Luciano |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 1-11 11 p. |
artikel |
25 |
Raising juveniles
|
Bell, Clive |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 32-51 20 p. |
artikel |
26 |
Robustness against indirect invasions
|
van Veelen, Matthijs |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 382-393 12 p. |
artikel |
27 |
Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection
|
Drouvelis, Michalis |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 102-119 18 p. |
artikel |
28 |
Stochastic games with information lag
|
Levy, Yehuda |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 243-256 14 p. |
artikel |
29 |
The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
|
Cheikbossian, Guillaume |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 68-82 15 p. |
artikel |
30 |
The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
|
Mandler, Michael |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 257-268 12 p. |
artikel |
31 |
The Herodotus paradox
|
Baye, Michael R. |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 399-406 8 p. |
artikel |
32 |
The strategic value of recall
|
Peretz, Ron |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 332-351 20 p. |
artikel |
33 |
The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case
|
Silvers, Randy |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 352-365 14 p. |
artikel |
34 |
Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange
|
Nicoló, Antonio |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 299-310 12 p. |
artikel |
35 |
When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
|
Faravelli, Marco |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 170-183 14 p. |
artikel |
36 |
Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust
|
McEvily, Bill |
|
2012 |
74 |
1 |
p. 285-298 14 p. |
artikel |