nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games
|
Banks, Jeffrey |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 1-31 31 p. |
artikel |
2 |
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions
|
Friedman, James W. |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 83-96 14 p. |
artikel |
3 |
A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality
|
Lipman, Barton L. |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 114-129 16 p. |
artikel |
4 |
Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies
|
Friedman, James W. |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 55-82 28 p. |
artikel |
5 |
Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming
|
Lehrer, Ehud |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 97-113 17 p. |
artikel |
6 |
Game Theory and Literature
|
Brams, Steven J. |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 32-54 23 p. |
artikel |
7 |
Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting
|
Ray, Debraj |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 162-177 16 p. |
artikel |
8 |
Stochastic Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games
|
Monahan, George E. |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 130-149 20 p. |
artikel |
9 |
The Shapley Value for n-Person Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
|
Nowak, Andrzej S. |
|
1994 |
6 |
1 |
p. 150-161 12 p. |
artikel |