nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations
|
Peleg, Bezalel |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 277-285 9 p. |
artikel |
2 |
An Optimal Auction for Complements
|
Levin, Jonathan |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 176-192 17 p. |
artikel |
3 |
A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
|
Forges, Françoise |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 159-175 17 p. |
artikel |
4 |
Author Index for Volume 18
|
|
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 332- 1 p. |
artikel |
5 |
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
|
Mailath, George J |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 193-218 26 p. |
artikel |
6 |
Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium
|
Sonsino, Doron |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 286-331 46 p. |
artikel |
7 |
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
|
Marx, Leslie M. |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 219-245 27 p. |
artikel |
8 |
Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games
|
Cripps, Martin W. |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 141-158 18 p. |
artikel |
9 |
Sequentially Optimal Auctions
|
McAfee, R.Preston |
|
1997 |
18 |
2 |
p. 246-276 31 p. |
artikel |