nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
An analytically solvable principal-agent model
|
Mattsson, Lars-Göran |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 33-49 |
artikel |
2 |
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time
|
Leng, Ailin |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 115-131 |
artikel |
3 |
Choice structures in games
|
Galeazzi, Paolo |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 431-455 |
artikel |
4 |
Competition with list prices
|
Haan, Marco A. |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 502-528 |
artikel |
5 |
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets
|
He, Wei |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 132-153 |
artikel |
6 |
Continuous level-k mechanism design
|
de Clippel, Geoffroy |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 481-501 |
artikel |
7 |
Designing weighted and directed networks under complementarities
|
Li, Xueheng |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 556-574 |
artikel |
8 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
140 |
C |
p. i |
artikel |
9 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
140 |
C |
p. ii |
artikel |
10 |
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
|
Li, Anqi |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 296-315 |
artikel |
11 |
Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum
|
Alger, Ingela |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 585-587 |
artikel |
12 |
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing
|
Altınok, Ahmet |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 456-480 |
artikel |
13 |
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design
|
McClellan, Andrew |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 173-180 |
artikel |
14 |
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information
|
Masiliūnas, Aidas |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 50-72 |
artikel |
15 |
Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution
|
Cui, Zhiwei |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 410-430 |
artikel |
16 |
Mechanism design with informational punishment
|
Balzer, Benjamin |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 197-209 |
artikel |
17 |
Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives
|
Feess, Eberhard |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 380-400 |
artikel |
18 |
Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples
|
Zhou, Yu |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 210-228 |
artikel |
19 |
Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
|
Tamura, Yuki |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 181-196 |
artikel |
20 |
On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
|
Prokopovych, Pavlo |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 348-362 |
artikel |
21 |
Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?
|
Ackfeld, Viola |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 1-32 |
artikel |
22 |
Price competition with capacity uncertainty - feasting on leftovers
|
Somogyi, Robert |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 253-271 |
artikel |
23 |
Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment
|
Wang, Tse-Min |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 363-379 |
artikel |
24 |
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information
|
Einy, Ezra |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 341-347 |
artikel |
25 |
Scheduling games with rank-based utilities
|
Rosner, Shaul |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 229-252 |
artikel |
26 |
Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding
|
Feldman, Michal |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 316-340 |
artikel |
27 |
Stability of alliance networks
|
Cai, Xinyue |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 401-409 |
artikel |
28 |
Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games
|
Yousefimanesh, Niloofar |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 529-555 |
artikel |
29 |
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
|
Minchuk, Yizhaq |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 99-114 |
artikel |
30 |
Targeting in networks under costly agreements
|
Belhaj, Mohamed |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 154-172 |
artikel |
31 |
Temptation and guilt
|
Noor, Jawwad |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 272-295 |
artikel |
32 |
The non-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions
|
Heifetz, Aviad |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 575-584 |
artikel |
33 |
The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games
|
Karakostas, Alexandros |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 73-87 |
artikel |
34 |
Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values
|
Skoda, Alexandre |
|
|
140 |
C |
p. 88-98 |
artikel |