| no |
title |
author |
magazine |
year |
volume |
issue |
page(s) |
type |
| 1 |
Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
|
Heggedal, Tom-Reiel
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 60-73
|
article
|
| 2 |
Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
|
Barthel, Anne-Christine
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 201-219
|
article
|
| 3 |
Corrigendum to “Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information” [Games Econ. Behav. 129 (2021) 350–369]
|
Gori, Michele
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 434-435
|
article
|
| 4 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. i
|
article
|
| 5 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. ii
|
article
|
| 6 |
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
|
Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 110-131
|
article
|
| 7 |
Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games
|
Tóbiás, Áron
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 327-337
|
article
|
| 8 |
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation
|
Awaya, Yu
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 41-59
|
article
|
| 9 |
Information design in sequential procurement
|
Fugger, Nicolas
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 79-85
|
article
|
| 10 |
Issue linkage
|
Currarini, S.
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 16-40
|
article
|
| 11 |
Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form
|
Heymann, Benjamin
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 220-240
|
article
|
| 12 |
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform
|
Aoyagi, Masaki
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 271-296
|
article
|
| 13 |
Monitoring innovation
|
Rodivilov, Alexander
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 297-326
|
article
|
| 14 |
Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
|
Hillas, John
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 1-15
|
article
|
| 15 |
On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games
|
Steg, Jan-Henrik
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 74-78
|
article
|
| 16 |
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency
|
Merzoni, Guido
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 132-143
|
article
|
| 17 |
Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods
|
Gächter, Simon
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 338-355
|
article
|
| 18 |
Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive
|
Fahn, Matthias
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 144-167
|
article
|
| 19 |
Projection bias in effort choices
|
Kaufmann, Marc
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 368-393
|
article
|
| 20 |
Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results
|
Ramezanian, Rasoul
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 356-367
|
article
|
| 21 |
The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior
|
Hillenbrand, Adrian
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 241-270
|
article
|
| 22 |
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
|
Bó, Inácio
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 411-433
|
article
|
| 23 |
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
|
Bonifacio, Agustín G.
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 188-200
|
article
|
| 24 |
The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
|
Pérez-Castrillo, David
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 96-109
|
article
|
| 25 |
The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
|
Aziz, Haris
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 168-187
|
article
|
| 26 |
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation
|
Ke, Changxia
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 394-410
|
article
|
| 27 |
Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
|
Prato, Carlo
|
|
|
135 |
C |
p. 86-95
|
article
|
Journal description