| no |
title |
author |
magazine |
year |
volume |
issue |
page(s) |
type |
| 1 |
A gift with thoughtfulness: A field experiment on work incentives
|
Cao, Cangjian
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 17-42
|
article
|
| 2 |
An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium
|
Chen, Yin
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 659-670
|
article
|
| 3 |
A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
|
Mackenzie, Andrew
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 512-533
|
article
|
| 4 |
Backward induction in games without perfect recall
|
Hillas, John
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 207-218
|
article
|
| 5 |
Can intermediaries assure contracts? Experimental evidence
|
Mitzkewitz, Michael
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 354-368
|
article
|
| 6 |
Cheap talk with coarse understanding
|
Hagenbach, Jeanne
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 105-121
|
article
|
| 7 |
Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
|
Boonmanunt, Suparee
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 569-578
|
article
|
| 8 |
Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
|
García-Pola, Bernardo
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 82-104
|
article
|
| 9 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. ii
|
article
|
| 10 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. i
|
article
|
| 11 |
Endogenous quantal response equilibrium
|
Friedman, Evan
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 620-643
|
article
|
| 12 |
Entering classes in the college admissions model
|
Wu, Qingyun
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 579-587
|
article
|
| 13 |
Equivalence of canonical matching models
|
Kennes, John
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 169-182
|
article
|
| 14 |
Framing and repeated competition
|
Masiliūnas, Aidas
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 604-619
|
article
|
| 15 |
Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
|
Renault, Jérôme
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 122-139
|
article
|
| 16 |
Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates
|
Karakas, Leyla D.
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 1-16
|
article
|
| 17 |
Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets
|
Shafer, Rachel C.
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 281-287
|
article
|
| 18 |
Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
|
Donna, Javier D.
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 406-431
|
article
|
| 19 |
Never underestimate your opponent: Hindsight bias causes overplacement and overentry into competition
|
Danz, David
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 588-603
|
article
|
| 20 |
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
|
Bonifacio, Agustín G.
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 219-238
|
article
|
| 21 |
On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
|
Levy, Yehuda John
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 140-168
|
article
|
| 22 |
Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
|
Ferrali, Romain
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 319-353
|
article
|
| 23 |
Pathways of persuasion
|
Coffman, Lucas
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 239-253
|
article
|
| 24 |
Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information
|
Abraham, Ittai
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 454-477
|
article
|
| 25 |
Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty
|
Shneyerov, Artyom
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 183-206
|
article
|
| 26 |
Regular potential games
|
Swenson, Brian
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 432-453
|
article
|
| 27 |
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
|
Sundararajan, Mukund
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 644-658
|
article
|
| 28 |
Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
|
Carbajal, Juan Carlos
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 386-405
|
article
|
| 29 |
Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
|
Szkup, Michal
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 534-553
|
article
|
| 30 |
Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments
|
d'Adda, Giovanna
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 288-304
|
article
|
| 31 |
The capacity constrained facility location problem
|
Aziz, Haris
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 478-490
|
article
|
| 32 |
The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations
|
Ciccarone, Giuseppe
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 554-568
|
article
|
| 33 |
The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
|
Hu, Gaoji
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 305-318
|
article
|
| 34 |
The timing of discretionary bonuses – effort, signals, and reciprocity
|
Boosey, Luke
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 254-280
|
article
|
| 35 |
Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
|
Sperisen, Benjamin
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 491-511
|
article
|
| 36 |
Undiscounted bandit games
|
Keller, Godfrey
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 43-61
|
article
|
| 37 |
Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
|
Schlegel, Jan Christoph
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 62-81
|
article
|
| 38 |
When consumers do not make an active decision: Dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects
|
Ericson, Keith M. Marzilli
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 369-385
|
article
|
Journal description