nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
A gift with thoughtfulness: A field experiment on work incentives
|
Cao, Cangjian |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 17-42 |
artikel |
2 |
An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium
|
Chen, Yin |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 659-670 |
artikel |
3 |
A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
|
Mackenzie, Andrew |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 512-533 |
artikel |
4 |
Backward induction in games without perfect recall
|
Hillas, John |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 207-218 |
artikel |
5 |
Can intermediaries assure contracts? Experimental evidence
|
Mitzkewitz, Michael |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 354-368 |
artikel |
6 |
Cheap talk with coarse understanding
|
Hagenbach, Jeanne |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 105-121 |
artikel |
7 |
Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
|
Boonmanunt, Suparee |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 569-578 |
artikel |
8 |
Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
|
García-Pola, Bernardo |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 82-104 |
artikel |
9 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. ii |
artikel |
10 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
124 |
C |
p. i |
artikel |
11 |
Endogenous quantal response equilibrium
|
Friedman, Evan |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 620-643 |
artikel |
12 |
Entering classes in the college admissions model
|
Wu, Qingyun |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 579-587 |
artikel |
13 |
Equivalence of canonical matching models
|
Kennes, John |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 169-182 |
artikel |
14 |
Framing and repeated competition
|
Masiliūnas, Aidas |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 604-619 |
artikel |
15 |
Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
|
Renault, Jérôme |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 122-139 |
artikel |
16 |
Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates
|
Karakas, Leyla D. |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 1-16 |
artikel |
17 |
Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets
|
Shafer, Rachel C. |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 281-287 |
artikel |
18 |
Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
|
Donna, Javier D. |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 406-431 |
artikel |
19 |
Never underestimate your opponent: Hindsight bias causes overplacement and overentry into competition
|
Danz, David |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 588-603 |
artikel |
20 |
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
|
Bonifacio, Agustín G. |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 219-238 |
artikel |
21 |
On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
|
Levy, Yehuda John |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 140-168 |
artikel |
22 |
Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
|
Ferrali, Romain |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 319-353 |
artikel |
23 |
Pathways of persuasion
|
Coffman, Lucas |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 239-253 |
artikel |
24 |
Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information
|
Abraham, Ittai |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 454-477 |
artikel |
25 |
Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty
|
Shneyerov, Artyom |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 183-206 |
artikel |
26 |
Regular potential games
|
Swenson, Brian |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 432-453 |
artikel |
27 |
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
|
Sundararajan, Mukund |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 644-658 |
artikel |
28 |
Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
|
Carbajal, Juan Carlos |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 386-405 |
artikel |
29 |
Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
|
Szkup, Michal |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 534-553 |
artikel |
30 |
Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments
|
d'Adda, Giovanna |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 288-304 |
artikel |
31 |
The capacity constrained facility location problem
|
Aziz, Haris |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 478-490 |
artikel |
32 |
The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations
|
Ciccarone, Giuseppe |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 554-568 |
artikel |
33 |
The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
|
Hu, Gaoji |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 305-318 |
artikel |
34 |
The timing of discretionary bonuses – effort, signals, and reciprocity
|
Boosey, Luke |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 254-280 |
artikel |
35 |
Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
|
Sperisen, Benjamin |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 491-511 |
artikel |
36 |
Undiscounted bandit games
|
Keller, Godfrey |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 43-61 |
artikel |
37 |
Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
|
Schlegel, Jan Christoph |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 62-81 |
artikel |
38 |
When consumers do not make an active decision: Dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects
|
Ericson, Keith M. Marzilli |
|
|
124 |
C |
p. 369-385 |
artikel |