| no |
title |
author |
magazine |
year |
volume |
issue |
page(s) |
type |
| 1 |
A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
|
Gatti, Nicola
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 240-255
|
article
|
| 2 |
Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach
|
Lehrer, Ehud
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 440-452
|
article
|
| 3 |
A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem
|
Dizdar, Deniz
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 407-412
|
article
|
| 4 |
Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian
|
Busetto, Francesca
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 318-327
|
article
|
| 5 |
Competition with an information clearinghouse and asymmetric firms: Why more than two firms compete (or not) for shoppers
|
Arnold, Michael
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 55-82
|
article
|
| 6 |
Consulting collusive experts
|
Mookherjee, Dilip
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 290-317
|
article
|
| 7 |
Correlated beliefs: Predicting outcomes in 2 × 2 games
|
Cason, Timothy N.
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 256-276
|
article
|
| 8 |
Determinants of trust: The role of personal experiences
|
Schwerter, Frederik
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 413-425
|
article
|
| 9 |
Distributions of centrality on networks
|
Dasaratha, Krishna
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 1-27
|
article
|
| 10 |
Dynamic price discovery: Transparency vs. information design
|
Kakhbod, Ali
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 203-232
|
article
|
| 11 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. i
|
article
|
| 12 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. ii
|
article
|
| 13 |
Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
|
Arigapudi, Srinivas
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 168-202
|
article
|
| 14 |
Fishing for fools
|
Malmendier, Ulrike
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 105-129
|
article
|
| 15 |
Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone
|
Talamàs, Eduard
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 277-289
|
article
|
| 16 |
Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment
|
Aina, Chiara
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 150-167
|
article
|
| 17 |
Habits as adaptations: An experimental study
|
Matysková, Ludmila
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 391-406
|
article
|
| 18 |
Information acquisition and welfare in network games
|
Leister, C. Matthew
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 453-475
|
article
|
| 19 |
Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study
|
Bayona, Anna
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 354-369
|
article
|
| 20 |
In-group bias in prisons
|
Guo, Shiqi
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 328-340
|
article
|
| 21 |
Lexicographic probabilities and robustness
|
Petri, Henrik
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 426-439
|
article
|
| 22 |
On self-serving strategic beliefs
|
Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 341-353
|
article
|
| 23 |
Preordered service in contract enforcement
|
Auerbach, Jan U.
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 130-149
|
article
|
| 24 |
Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side
|
Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 83-104
|
article
|
| 25 |
Stability in matching markets with peer effects
|
Bykhovskaya, Anna
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 28-54
|
article
|
| 26 |
Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games
|
Hwang, Sung-Ha
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 370-390
|
article
|
| 27 |
Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions: Comment
|
Hagiwara, Makoto
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 476-480
|
article
|
| 28 |
The evolution of monetary equilibrium
|
Norman, Thomas W.L.
|
|
|
122 |
C |
p. 233-239
|
article
|
Journal description