nr |
titel |
auteur |
tijdschrift |
jaar |
jaarg. |
afl. |
pagina('s) |
type |
1 |
A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
|
Chun, Youngsub |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 486-490 |
artikel |
2 |
Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions
|
Bhaskar, Umang |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 533-569 |
artikel |
3 |
A model of pre-electoral coalition formation
|
Shin, Euncheol |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 463-485 |
artikel |
4 |
An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
|
Izquierdo, Luis R. |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 434-462 |
artikel |
5 |
A stable marriage requires communication
|
Gonczarowski, Yannai A. |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 626-647 |
artikel |
6 |
Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
|
De, Parikshit |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 342-353 |
artikel |
7 |
Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach
|
Alon, Shiri |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 60-71 |
artikel |
8 |
Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: The impact of higher-order history
|
Gong, Binglin |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 316-341 |
artikel |
9 |
Corrigendum to “Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems” [Games Econ. Behav. 68 (1) (2010) 220–232]
|
Kayı, Çağatay |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 491-492 |
artikel |
10 |
Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation
|
Tabasso, Nicole |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 219-240 |
artikel |
11 |
Economic efficiency requires interaction
|
Dobzinski, Shahar |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 589-608 |
artikel |
12 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
118 |
C |
p. i |
artikel |
13 |
Editorial Board
|
|
|
|
118 |
C |
p. ii |
artikel |
14 |
Endogenous price leadership with an essential input
|
Madden, Paul |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 47-59 |
artikel |
15 |
Farsighted stability in patent licensing: An abstract game approach
|
Hirai, Toshiyuki |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 141-160 |
artikel |
16 |
Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
|
Hoffmann, Eric J. |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 72-93 |
artikel |
17 |
Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”
|
Barbieri, Stefano |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 382-411 |
artikel |
18 |
Group targeting under networked synergies
|
Belhaj, Mohamed |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 29-46 |
artikel |
19 |
Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
|
Gui, Zhengqing |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 412-433 |
artikel |
20 |
Information choice in a social learning experiment
|
Duffy, John |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 295-315 |
artikel |
21 |
Introduction to the Special Issue – Algorithmic Game Theory – STOC/FOCS/SODA 2014-2015
|
Dughmi, Shaddin |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 493 |
artikel |
22 |
Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists
|
Bergstrom, Ted |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 269-283 |
artikel |
23 |
Lying and reciprocity
|
Dato, Simon |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 193-218 |
artikel |
24 |
Obvious belief elicitation
|
Tsakas, Elias |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 374-381 |
artikel |
25 |
On comparison of experts
|
Kavaler, Itay |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 94-109 |
artikel |
26 |
On the hardness of designing public signals
|
Dughmi, Shaddin |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 609-625 |
artikel |
27 |
On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria
|
Balkenborg, Dieter |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 1-6 |
artikel |
28 |
Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
|
Alaei, Saeed |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 494-510 |
artikel |
29 |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales
|
Devanur, Nikhil R. |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 570-588 |
artikel |
30 |
Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
|
Azar, Pablo D. |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 511-532 |
artikel |
31 |
Rationalizable strategies in random games
|
Pei, Ting |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 110-125 |
artikel |
32 |
Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
|
Kim, Duk Gyoo |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 161-175 |
artikel |
33 |
Should straw polls be banned?
|
Ali, S. Nageeb |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 284-294 |
artikel |
34 |
Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: A tale of two rules
|
Athanasoglou, Stergios |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 126-140 |
artikel |
35 |
The endgame
|
Banerjee, Anurag N. |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 176-192 |
artikel |
36 |
The swing voter's curse in social networks
|
Buechel, Berno |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 241-268 |
artikel |
37 |
Tick size, price grids and market performance: Stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium
|
Plott, Charles |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 7-28 |
artikel |
38 |
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago
|
Doğan, Battal |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 366-373 |
artikel |
39 |
Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture
|
Newton, Jonathan |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 354-365 |
artikel |
40 |
Welfare maximization with production costs: A primal dual approach
|
Huang, Zhiyi |
|
|
118 |
C |
p. 648-667 |
artikel |