David Hume’s naturalistic approach is encapsulated in the few passages where he writes about love and sex. There, in microcosm, we have his holistic treatment of cognition, religion and morality. Thus, in exploring Hume’s account of sexual attraction, I shall clarify certain notions that are integral to Hume’s world view. These include projection, the role of the passions, and our animal nature. Firstly, Hume’s account of such attraction is described. Key to this is the claim that when one feels attraction in this way, then lust, kindness and the perception of beauty are ‘almost sure’ to be conjoined. Various problems with this claim are considered. I argue, however, that Hume has the resources to solve these problems. I then focus upon Hume’s anti-realism with respect to beauty and the role of projection. I suggest ways that Hume’s account could be developed, those consonant with the role that projection plays elsewhere in his philosophy. Lastly I investigate the prima facie tension between Hume’s hostility towards religion, especially towards the ‘monkish virtue’ of celibacy, and his own claim that lust is vulgar. Hume, however, is consistent. His claim of vulgarity is grounded in his naturalistic account of how untrammelled lust is damaging to society, whereas sexual restraint contributes to economic stability and to the social status of the restrained. Throughout, the role of the imagination is stressed. Moral judgements arise from the flux of one’s sentiments and passions controlled by the Humean imagination, and the principles of association also ensure that the passions and appetites characteristic of sexual attraction are constantly conjoined. The imagination is the cement of the universe and, on the more intimate scale, it is the cement that glues us together as friends and sexual partners.
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