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                                       Details for article 34 of 50 found articles
 
 
  Politics, institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile
 
 
Title: Politics, institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile
Author: Heller, William B.
McCubbins, Mathew D.
Appeared in: Journal of economic policy reform
Paging: Volume 1 (1996) nr. 4 pages 357-387
Year: 1996
Contents: Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible. Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.
Publisher: Routledge
Source file: Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften
 
 

                             Details for article 34 of 50 found articles
 
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