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| Titel: |
Dretske, representation, and the mental/non-mental distinction |
| Auteur: |
Wallis, Charles |
| Verschenen in: |
Journal of experimental & theoretical artificial intelligence |
| Paginering: | Jaargang 5 (1993) nr. 1 pagina's 73-82 |
| Jaar: |
1993-01-01 |
| Inhoud: |
In Explaining Behavior, Dretske accepts the metaphysical doctrine that the representational properties of states such as belief must prove causally operative in generating output. Dretske's acceptance of this doctrine causes him to worry about how representational systems can be minds, and drives him to argue for a hierarchy of representational systems with believers occupying the highest level and Type I conventional systems occupying the lowest level. I claim that Dretske's distinctions between Type II conventional systems and believers, as well as between innate natural representers and believers, are undermined by the very arguments that Dretske uses to support these divisions. I go on to claim that the problems that motivate Dretske are actually based on a misconception about the general structure of explanation in cognitive science. |
| Uitgever: |
Taylor & Francis |
| Bronbestand: |
Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften |
Details van artikel 3 van 5 gevonden artikelen
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