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Details van artikel 92 van 135 gevonden artikelen
| Titel: |
Supranational institution-building in the European Union: a comparison of the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank |
| Auteur: |
Heisenberg, Dorothee Richmond, Amy |
| Verschenen in: |
Journal of European public policy |
| Paginering: | Jaargang 9 (2002) nr. 2 pagina's 201-218 |
| Jaar: |
2002-04-01 |
| Inhoud: |
The completion of the ECB provides an opportunity to compare how the EU builds new institutions. We compare two institutions (the bank and the court) which have a similar supranational status, but whose creation differed significantly. We examine the genesis of the two institutions and ask how the workings of these institutions have been affected by the initial mandate. We pose the question of whether the ECB will lend itself to a realist interpretation about the institution's independence from member state interference similar to existing interpretations of the ECJ (Garrett 1995). Because of the different path set by the institutional design of the ECB, we conclude that the neorealist analysis of the ECJ-member state relationship is unlikely to resonate in the case of the ECB. We argue that the institutional creation of the ECJ and the ECB differed in four relevant ways: 1) the intended supranationalism of the initial design; 2) the specificity of the institution's mandate; 3) the institution's relationship to its national counterpart; and 4) institutional copying from the national to the supranational level. We find that each of these elements has significant implications for the institutions' autonomy. |
| Uitgever: |
Routledge |
| Bronbestand: |
Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften |
Details van artikel 92 van 135 gevonden artikelen
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