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Details van artikel 4 van 6 gevonden artikelen
| Titel: |
Shapley value predicts the distribution of eu expenditure among member states |
| Auteur: |
Soukenik, Karel |
| Verschenen in: |
Journal of european integration |
| Paginering: | Jaargang 23 (2001) nr. 2 pagina's 165-198 |
| Jaar: |
2001 |
| Inhoud: |
The paper provides a game-theoretic analysis of the allocation of expenditure from the EU budget among member states. The annual budgetary procedure is modelled as a cooperative game with transferable utility played by member states. The Shapley value of this game predicts the distribution of expenditure relatively well. When tested on data from 1976-95, the game-theoretic model outperforms cross-section models regressing EU expenditure on macroeconomic explanatory variables. This confirms that, contrary to the philosophy of cohesion, the aspect of redistribution plays a significant role in EU budgetary bargaining. Finally, the proposed model is used to forecast the budgetary implications of the prospective enlargement of the Union. |
| Uitgever: |
Routledge |
| Bronbestand: |
Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften |
Details van artikel 4 van 6 gevonden artikelen
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