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Details for article 1 of 6 found articles
| Title: |
APPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY DECISION MAKING |
| Author: |
Coats, Jennifer C. |
| Appeared in: |
International journal of public administration |
| Paging: | Volume 25 (2002) nr. 4 pages 441-461 |
| Year: |
2002-03-04 |
| Contents: |
This paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal-agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making. In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced. It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services. This provides an alterative to the identification of key decision properties “from the ground up” for each good or service the government provides. |
| Publisher: |
Routledge |
| Source file: |
Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften |
Details for article 1 of 6 found articles
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