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| Titel: |
Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism |
| Auteur: |
Walker, Mark Thomas |
| Verschenen in: |
International journal of philosophical studies |
| Paginering: | Jaargang 9 (2001) nr. 2 pagina's 199-227 |
| Jaar: |
2001-02-09 |
| Inhoud: |
Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinsim can allow for the role played by logical insight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how this result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifically upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed to 'practical' rationalization. |
| Uitgever: |
Routledge |
| Bronbestand: |
Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften |
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