Solving the Tenants? Dilemma: Collective Action and Norms of Co-operation in Housing
Titel:
Solving the Tenants? Dilemma: Collective Action and Norms of Co-operation in Housing
Auteur:
Bengtsson, Bo
Verschenen in:
Housing, theory and society
Paginering:
Jaargang 17 (2000) nr. 4 pagina's 175-187
Jaar:
2000-11-01
Inhoud:
According to Mancur Olson's free-rider theorem, collective action will neither be initiated, nor sustained unless it is found profitable by every single participant. This "n-person prisoners' dilemma" indicates that the successful cases of co-operation, not the failures, call for an explanation; this is the theoretical starting point for a study of tenant involvement in Swedish housing estates. The local histories of 26 housing estates of different characters and forms of tenure were reconstructed in order to trace the norms and other social mechanisms behind the sustenance and institutionalization of collective action. In most of the estates where co-operation had been institutionalized the crucial mechanism seemed to have been the development of norms of local utilitarianism ("I take part if it is needed and I can contribute to the collective good."). Co-operation based on this norm tends to be representative rather than direct, and the level of activity is comparatively low. In some types of estates more contract-like norms of reciprocity ("I take part if others take part.") had also developed. Selective economic incentives and tenants' self-realization were of less importance in upholding co-operation in housing estates. Institutionalization of co-operation was observed in all types of estate, regardless of physical and social characteristics. In the critical consolidation phase, an important role was played by norms of everyday Kantianism ("I take part regardless of what others do."). Leisure activities and "estate days", information to tenants, etc., were important in developing and reproducing a local identity and social norms of co-operation.
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