Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof: reply to Tony Roark
Titel:
Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof: reply to Tony Roark
Auteur:
Klima, Gyula
Verschenen in:
History and philosophy of logic
Paginering:
Jaargang 24 (2003) nr. 2 pagina's 131-134
Jaar:
2003-06
Inhoud:
This paper provides replies to the objections Tony Roark presented (Roark, T. 2003. 'Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof', History and Philosophy of Logic 24 ) to my reconstruction of Anselm's famous argument in the Proslogion (Klima, G. 2000. 'Saint Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding', in G. Holmstrom-Hintikka, Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 69 S- S87). The replies argue that Roark's objections actually strengthen the general conclusion of my original paper concerning the different attitudes one can take toward Anselm's argument, depending on whether one refers to that than which nothing greater can be thought 'constitutively' or 'parasitically'. In agreement with Roark, however, at the end of the paper I also indicate some of the broader implications of this distinction worthy of further exploration.
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