Sino-US relations are the most problematic of all the great power relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, and in that relationship it is the question of Taiwan and its future that is the most difficult. However, through trial and error over the last 50 years, China and the United States have established a workable framework in which to manage their relationship and any crisis that might arise over the Taiwan issue. Essentially, China and the United States are sticking to certain rules that make conflict over Taiwan avoidable and unlikely, despite outbursts of posturing and rhetoric. The rules are that the United States will intervene only if China uses force against Taiwan, but China will use force only if Taiwan declares independence or continually refuses to negotiate. The new and eminently pragmatic Taiwanese President, Chen Shui-bian, however, has said he will not declare independence if China does not attack. He has also indicated a willingness to open up negotiations with Beijing. The sticking point is the definition of 'one China' but there have been subtle signs of some flexibility on this issue. There are any number of variables that might upset the chance of China and Taiwan settling their dispute over the meaning of 'one China', with disastrous consequences for both parties, for China-US relations and for the Asia-Pacific region in general. Most recently published articles are uniformly pessimistic. In the author's view, however, the prospects of a redefinition of the meaning of 'one China', to the satisfaction of both sides, are improving and the likelihood of a confrontation over the issue, at least in the foreseeable future, is receding. If so, this will remove one of the irritants in Sino-US relations.
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