Uncertainty in Mexico's protracted transition: The national action party and its aversion to risk
Title:
Uncertainty in Mexico's protracted transition: The national action party and its aversion to risk
Author:
Loaeza, Soledad
Appeared in:
Democratization
Paging:
Volume 7 (2000) nr. 3 pages 93-116
Year:
2000
Contents:
Contrary to arguments that the party in power is the only one that benefits from prolonged democratic transitions, this article demonstrates that other actors such as Mexico's National Action Party (PAN), might also benefit from longer durations of transition. They might actively promote such outcomes, as befits their level of institutionalization, values, and constituent interests. Identifying aversion to risk as the main incentive which prompts parties to favour protracted transitions, the article makes three related arguments relating the perception of political uncertainty to PAN's role in Mexico's protracted transition. First, considering the time frame as the defining variable of protracted transitions, the impact of this factor on protracted transitions is qualitatively different from its effect on accelerated transitions, especially in relation to levels of uncertainty perceived by actors such as the PAN. Secondly, the article proposes that the pace of transition depends on whether reaching a negotiated pact is indispensable to the political futures of the regime and opposition. In other words, if major actors agree that extreme outcomes must be avoided, then a transition outcome will be reached faster than if only one important actor (such as the PAN) fails to perceive the existence of such urgency, and perhaps even believes that prolonging negotiations will be to its advantage. Thirdly, upon distinguishing between altruistic and egoistic actors, the article concludes that the PAN tends to adopt altruistic strategies which benefit overall stability, even though the party frequently incurs political costs as a result.
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