British Nuclear Doctrine: The 'Moscow Criterion' and the Polaris Improvement Programme
Title:
British Nuclear Doctrine: The 'Moscow Criterion' and the Polaris Improvement Programme
Author:
Baylis, John
Appeared in:
Contemporary British history
Paging:
Volume 19 (2005) nr. 1 pages 53-65
Year:
2005
Contents:
This article focuses on continuity and change in British nuclear doctrine, especially in terms of targeting policy. After an initial assessment in 1945 that nuclear weapons would be scarce and would therefore have to be targeted, if war broke out, against urban centres, British nuclear strategy in the early Cold War period was based upon the concept of counter-force deterrence. This meant that projected nuclear forces were targeted against Soviet military forces in order to reduce damage to the United Kingdom because of its particular vulnerability in the nuclear age. Just as Britain deployed its first nuclear weapons, however, the superpowers were developing thermonuclear weapons. This led to a re-evaluation of British nuclear doctrine in the late 1950s in which Britain sought greater interdependence with the United States and, at the same time, stressed the importance of maintaining an independent targeting policy. 'Deterrence in concert' with the United States involved targeting a mix of military and urban centres, while 'unilateral deterrence' now targeted Soviet cities. The Polaris force, deployed in the late 1960s, was particularly suited for counter-value targeting. Almost immediately, however, Soviet ABM developments caused strategic planners in Britain to undertake an improvement programme, designed to ensure that counter-vale deterrence maintained its credibility. Critical to this conception, it was believed, was the ability to target Moscow, and the secret British Chevaline project was designed essentially to maintain this priority. This article sets out to explain the importance of the 'Moscow criterion' in British nuclear doctrine and the difficulties Britain faced in trying to maintain the capabilities, which would achieve what successive governments perceived to be the central requirements of deterrence.
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