Not to offend: Observations on Iran, the hostages, and the hostage rescue mission—ten years later
Titel:
Not to offend: Observations on Iran, the hostages, and the hostage rescue mission—ten years later
Auteur:
Cogan, Charles G.
Verschenen in:
Comparative strategy
Paginering:
Jaargang 9 (1990) nr. 4 pagina's 415-432
Jaar:
1990
Inhoud:
Ten years ago, in a devilish “soft war” scenario, Iranian militants seized 65 (later 53) innocent American officials in Tehran. The move was immediately endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who soon laid down his terms: no harm to the hostages but no release until Iran had gained satisfaction for its “grievances.” The Carter Administration hesitated, as a dialectic within the U. S. leadership emerged. One group held that the hostages would be released after they had served the purposes of the Iranian revolution, and that patient, dogged diplomacy was what was required. Another group held that Khomeini would respond to pressure and that U.S. national honor was being flouted. The extreme expression of the former group was that a way had to be found so that Khomeini could claim victory, in order to achieve the hostages' release (whence is derived the principal significance of the title of the article). After months of tergiversations, during which sometimes promising but generally unsuccessful attempts at negotiations took place, a rescue operation, highly risky in itself, was finally decided upon, partly because it was less liable to start a war. Although the consequences proved not to be irreparable, either politically or militarily, Tabas (Desert One) will forever be a blot on American arms. Ten years later, with the United States again engaged in efforts to secure the release of its hostages in the Middle East, it remains important to draw what lessons we can from this painful period in our history. Whether conventional military measures would have worked better is questionable. Perhaps they should have been tried. One clear political lesson emerges: If there was a need to show understanding of what had gone on between the United States and Iran, for what were considered by different U.S. administrations to be reasons of state, why should this have been made to Khomeini's despotism? In other words, understand others but act according to your own lights.
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