Intelligence may be thought of as three kinds of activities carried out by secretive agencies: first, the gathering, interpreting, and distribution of information (collection and analysis, for short); second, clandestine attempts to manipulate events abroad (covert action); and, third, the guarding against the hostile operations of foreign intelligence agencies (counterintelligence). This paper examines a core set of propositions about these activities that, taken together, point toward the outlines of a theoretical framework for understanding intelligence. The propositions and the evidence suggest that effective collection and analysis is, above all, a function of national wealth, but depends as well on focused targeting, all-source synergism, and good communication links (“liaison”) between intelligence officers and policy officials. Successful, sustained covert action also relies on national wealth, and is a function in addition of modest objectives, weak targets, and the support of well-armed local allies. Successful counterintelligence requires national wealth and technical sophistication, along with an attitude of serious attention to security matters (which usually rises only after a major security breach).
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