Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning
Titel:
Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning
Auteur:
Jajko, Walter
Verschenen in:
Comparative strategy
Paginering:
Jaargang 21 (2002) nr. 5 pagina's 351-363
Jaar:
2002-10
Inhoud:
The United States has rarely resorted to strategic deception, even when appropriate opportunities for its use have occurred and even though its adversaries have used it. The U.S. tends to view deception as unacceptable; yet, used knowledgeably and artfully, it can be a powerful, economic, and sometimes decisive instrument. Deception is an exceptional instrument of national security policy and an essential element of military operations. Deception targets the adversarial decisionmaker; his mind is the decisive battlespace. The indispensable conditions for the sustained conduct of deception are an apparatus, policy, philosophy, practitioners, and practice. The process of creating and executing a deception requires six rigorous and meticulous steps. The U.S. ought to use deception systematically to attack its adversaries' long-range, high-payoff targets.
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