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| Titel: |
Indian and Pakistani views on nuclear deterrence |
| Auteur: |
Giles, Gregory F. Doyle, James E. |
| Verschenen in: |
Comparative strategy |
| Paginering: | Jaargang 15 (1996) nr. 2 pagina's 135-159 |
| Jaar: |
1996-04 |
| Inhoud: |
While officials in India and Pakistan have been virtually silent on the issue of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, a small number of nonofficial strategists in both countries are moving to fill the void. They describe the current low-level nuclear standoff as “recessed deterrence.” Nuclear weapons advocates within this group have voiced their dissatisfaction with the status quo, ostensibly because nuclear ambiguity undermines stability. This has led them to promote the concept of “minimum deterrence,” described essentially as a scaled-down version of the superpower assured destruction doctrine. Generally, strategists that favor nuclear deployment have high confidence that India and Pakistan would be responsible nuclear powers. They also contend that just as nuclear deterrence stabilized U.S.-Soviet relations, so too can it work for South Asia. Other analysts are more skeptical, both of the premise behind minimum deterrence and the observance of nuclear restraint in the subcontinent. They likewise question the applicability of the superpower model of deterrence for India and Pakistan. |
| Uitgever: |
Routledge |
| Bronbestand: |
Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften |
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