Faced with growing criticism of a foreign policy that is regarded as too soft, too pro-Western, and insufficiently attentive to Russian national interests—and the opposition comes not only from the so-called “reds and browns” and the military, but from centrist and democratic circles as well—President Yeltsin has been obliged to cede foreign policy positions in an effort to save domestic ones. It is a measure of the Russian president's uncertain hold on power that much of the opposition program outlined by his foreign minister, in a mock speech last December, has since become the official language of Russian diplomacy. The concept of national interest has become a codeword for internal opposition to Russia's foreign and domestic policy, and the debate has ranged over such issues as Russia's Eurasian roots, the extent of Moscow's authority over the territory of the former USSR, and an appropriate national security strategy for Russia. Post-communist Russia has still to determine its national identity, national character, and national interests in world affairs. It is an inauspicious time for such a debate: constitutional crisis has reinforced separatist tendencies, economic decline has promoted regional autarkies, and disparate political philosophies project competing images of state and nation. Nevertheless, at the same time, there is a nation-building quality to the process, as it seeks to identify common values and expectations. An enlightened view of its strategic interests could form a basis for Russian foreign policy that is both understandable and predictable. The danger lies in the prospect that the search for the national interest will continue to elude a national consensus.
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