President Bush and Afghanistan: A turning point in American policy
Titel:
President Bush and Afghanistan: A turning point in American policy
Auteur:
Goldman, Minton F.
Verschenen in:
Comparative strategy
Paginering:
Jaargang 11 (1992) nr. 2 pagina's 177-193
Jaar:
1992-04
Inhoud:
Although the United States welcomed the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in early February 1989, the Bush administration did not think the Kremlin had gone far enough in diminishing its influence over internal Afghan politics because a pro-Soviet communist regime well armed by the Kremlin continued in power in Kabul. President Bush, therefore, decided in early 1989 to continue American support of the anticommunist insurgency, or Mujaheddin (freedom fighters), and their goal of defeating and replacing the Soviet-installed communist regime in Kabul. But within a few months of this decision the administration had strong incentives to rethink and revise U.S. policy. While continuing American military assistance to the Mujaheddin, the administration used diplomacy with the Kremlin to find a non-military solution to the civil war. President Bush was less certain than President Reagan about how to achieve American objectives in Afghanistan. Disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the Mujaheddin, difficulties with Pakistan's role as an ally of the United States, growing skepticism in Congress about the efficacy and the morality of past U.S. military aid to the Mujaheddin and of unqualified support of the war against Kabul, and a steady improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, provided new incentives for diplomatic cooperation with the Soviet Union to achieve U.S. goals in Afghanistan. But altering U.S. policy in response to changing circumstances was not easy, especially when compromise with the USSR was involved. There was lingering American suspicion of Soviet expansionist intent in the Third World, and in Afghanistan in particular, despite the advocacy of caution and restraint in “new thinking.” Strong conservative pressures on Bush, who was not altogether unsympathetic to them, restrained him from conceding too much to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the Kabul Regime and the Mujaheddin had their own agenda and had indicated a reluctance to accept a U.S.-Soviet agreement that did not satisfy them, and both the Kremlin and the Bush administration were reluctant to exert a decisive pressure on their clients. Thus, although U.S. policy seemed to have softened somewhat, a final settlement by the United States and USSR of their Afghan irritant remained elusive.
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