In 1977, the Carter Admimstration cancelled the B-1 bomber program. This paper assesses the impact of that decision on national security, within the context of the overall American offensive/defensive posture and the US/ Soviet balance. It is the author's contention that the Administration, in reducing the manned bombers to secondary status, is abandoning the Strategic Triad of bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and land-based missiles which has been the basis of our national defense posture for 20 years. Further, the deterioration of the land-based missile capability, a result of the increasing vulnerability of the Minuteman force to Soviet strikes and the hostility of the Administration to the follow-on mobile MX program, means that in the 1980s we must rely essentially on a Strategic Monad—the submarine fleet. Absolutely accurate “hairline analysis” could still protect us, but should such calculations fail, should unknown factors enter—then a catastrophe unparalleled in the nation's history could occur.
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