The decision to enter peace negotiations in a protracted internal conflict is complex, difficult, and potentially dangerous to both sides: each will distrust the other and fear appearing weak or being duped. Analysis of this issue has been dominated by Zartman's notion of a 'ripe moment' for negotiations that emerges when a 'mutually hurting stalemate' obtains. Both terms are inherently ambiguous, badly defined, and analytically unhelpful: if negotiations occurred, a ripe moment existed; if negotiations did not occur, a ripe moment did not exist, by definition. A more complex model of the process of decision is herein derived from a theory of convergence. The leader and/or the leadership group must conclude that three streams of influence have converged in a fashion that makes the risk of entering negotiations bearable. These three streams are: first, the sense that the problem (the conflict) has reached a stage where neither can either win or lose politically or militarily; second, that policy options exist that are mutually bearable, even if the same options had been resisted earlier; third, that the domestic balance of power for each side suggests that each leader is strong enough to engender sufficient support for a compromise peace. This dynamic model of complex leadership decisions in a dangerous environment seems more accurate and usable than Zartman's notion of specific conditions that must be present before a ripe moment occurs.
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