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Details for article 130 of 202 found articles
| Title: |
No cure, be paid: super-contingent fee contracts |
| Author: |
Schoonbeek, Lambert Kooreman, Peter |
| Appeared in: |
Applied economics letters |
| Paging: | Volume 12 (2005) nr. 9 pages 549-551 |
| Year: |
2005-07-15 |
| Contents: |
A general principal-agent problem with two possible outputs, high or low is considered. The agent's utility function is additively separable in wealth and effort. It is shown that under the optimal contract, the agent should pay a penalty fee to the principal if the low output occurs. |
| Publisher: |
Routledge |
| Source file: |
Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften |
Details for article 130 of 202 found articles
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