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                                       Details for article 2 of 24 found articles
 
 
  Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
 
 
Title: Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
Author: Diermeier, Daniel
Fong, Pohan
Appeared in: Games and economic behavior
Paging: Volume 76 (2012) nr. 1 pages 5 p.
Year: 2012
Contents:
Publisher: Elsevier Inc.
Source file: Elektronische Wetenschappelijke Tijdschriften
 
 

                             Details for article 2 of 24 found articles
 
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