Can large trade shocks cause crises? The case of the Finnish–Soviet trade collapse 1 1 This is a substantially revised version of a paper circulated earlier under the title “Kiss Me Deadly. From Finnish Great Depression to Great Recession”. The opinions in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Bank of Finland or the European System of Central Banks. We thank two anonymous referees and the editor for all comments and suggestions. We benefited from discussions with João Amador, Gene Ambrocio, Christiane Baumeister, Giovanni Caggiano, Fabio Canova, Martin Ellison, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Eleonora Granziera, Seppo Honkapohja, Esa Jokivuolle, Mikael Juselius, Bill Kerr, Manfred Kremer, Niku Määttänen, Nigel McClung, Enrique Mendoza, Haroon Mumtaz, Emi Nakamura, Elias Oikarinen, Evi Pappa, Jouko Rautava, Antti Ripatti, Jean–Charles Rochet, Pentti Saikkonen, Pekka Sutela, Juha Tarkka, Linda Tesar, and Fabio Verona, as well as conference and seminar participants at AEA, BICEPS, CEF, Dynare, ECB Cluster II, EEA, Eesti Pank, ESWC Montreal, EUI, FEA, Finnish Ministry of Finance, HECER, HMRAD, IAAE, Inter–American Development Bank, MMF, MMM Miami, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Philadelphia FED, PT, SED, T2M Berlin, University of Jyväskylä, University of Manchester and University of Turku. We thank Lauri Esala, Janne Lehto and Juhani Törrönen for excellent research assistance, as well as Eero Savolainen, Reijo Siiskonen and Matti Virén for providing us with parts of the data. Any errors or shortcomings are ours.
Titel:
Can large trade shocks cause crises? The case of the Finnish–Soviet trade collapse 1 1 This is a substantially revised version of a paper circulated earlier under the title “Kiss Me Deadly. From Finnish Great Depression to Great Recession”. The opinions in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Bank of Finland or the European System of Central Banks. We thank two anonymous referees and the editor for all comments and suggestions. We benefited from discussions with João Amador, Gene Ambrocio, Christiane Baumeister, Giovanni Caggiano, Fabio Canova, Martin Ellison, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Eleonora Granziera, Seppo Honkapohja, Esa Jokivuolle, Mikael Juselius, Bill Kerr, Manfred Kremer, Niku Määttänen, Nigel McClung, Enrique Mendoza, Haroon Mumtaz, Emi Nakamura, Elias Oikarinen, Evi Pappa, Jouko Rautava, Antti Ripatti, Jean–Charles Rochet, Pentti Saikkonen, Pekka Sutela, Juha Tarkka, Linda Tesar, and Fabio Verona, as well as conference and seminar participants at AEA, BICEPS, CEF, Dynare, ECB Cluster II, EEA, Eesti Pank, ESWC Montreal, EUI, FEA, Finnish Ministry of Finance, HECER, HMRAD, IAAE, Inter–American Development Bank, MMF, MMM Miami, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Philadelphia FED, PT, SED, T2M Berlin, University of Jyväskylä, University of Manchester and University of Turku. We thank Lauri Esala, Janne Lehto and Juhani Törrönen for excellent research assistance, as well as Eero Savolainen, Reijo Siiskonen and Matti Virén for providing us with parts of the data. Any errors or shortcomings are ours.