Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?
Title:
Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?
Author:
Blackburn, Simon
Appeared in:
Inquiry
Paging:
Volume 42 (1999) nr. 2 pages 213-227
Year:
1999-06-01
Contents:
This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which superficially seem better adapted to defending robust and substantive conceptions of moral truth, in fact face more danger from the threat of relativism. This is particularly so in the case of 'secondary quality' or 'response-dependent' approaches, but also in the case of certain kinds of constructivism.
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