This paper examines the impact of increasing criminal cooperation programmes for police handler-informant relationships. Over the last two decades, many countries have introduced policies to regulate the use of criminal informants and defendants who agree to provide information or testimony in exchange for financial incentives, protection, and leniency. Many researchers assume this trend has no bearing on the relationship between the handler and the informant. Following this assumption, they maintain that agreements made with criminal trade participants are still informally negotiated and unsupervised. I investigate this oversight, drawing on data obtained from in-depth interviews with handlers and informants. Findings from this fieldwork illustrate that, in order to compensate for weakening of their discretionary power, police officers are developing new deceptive tactics in dealing with informants. Furthermore, the increasingly institutionalised use of informants has given handlers a false sense of security. Informants gain skills and knowledge from their relationship with handlers, which they can use to undermine the handler's authority.
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