The development and decay of Western thought on military planning over three centuries privileged one form of strategic thinking over another, reducing the ability of Western armed forces to deal with contemporary threats. The new military science called, by 1810, 'strategy', promised victory within a framework that privileged long-term institutional and state security. Building on anthropological, historical, and sociological insight, driven by empathy with the enemy, it eventually became possible to conceive of bloodless war. As military and political contexts became increasingly complicated in the nineteenth century, though, theorists of strategy such as Clausewitz struggled to adapt to epistemic change. But unable to adapt to new kinds of knowledge, military institutions suppressed cultural insights required for adaptation. Instead they stressed easier-to-teach tools like mapping, anticipation of enemy movements, and rapid response. In the 21st century the American military remains entrenched in the logic of decaying strategic thinking of the 19th century. In place of strategy, it relies on 'stratagem', emphasizing technology and surprise over long-term planning. Institutional inertia and intensive training amplify the conceptual distance in battle between the First and Third Worlds. Third World combatants are challenged to level the playing field through a return to long-term adaptation. The decay of Western strategy is therefore directly linked to the rise of violent terrorism. Only a return to classical strategy can overcome this trend.
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